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BEYOND BORDERS: CAFTA’S ROLE IN SHAPING LABOR
STANDARDS IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
Lyndsay D. Speece ∗
INTRODUCTION
The world in which we live is becoming more intertwined as
each day passes—this is evident in aspects as elementary as an individual’s choice of clothing for the day: a dress shirt manufactured in
Singapore, khaki pants made in Morocco, fashionably completed by a
matching belt and shoe set from the finest leather in Brazil. As the
international intermingling of products persists, the disparities between those wearing the stylish ensemble and those providing the
outfit become more pronounced. In recent years, stories of sweat
1
2
shops in South Asia and “maquiladora” workers in Mexico have
caught the attention of many and brought to the forefront a concern
for the sub-standard working conditions of foreign laborers.
At the same time, the U.S. executive and legislative branches
have ardently pushed for the expansion of bilateral and multilateral
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) to bolster the American economy,
3
stabilize national security, and promote democracy. In this context,
∗
J.D., May 2007, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2003, University of
Nebraska, Omaha. The author would like to thank Anita R. Speece for her encouragement and support with this comment.
1
See BOB HEPPLE, LABOUR LAWS AND GLOBAL TRADE 6 n.13 (2005) (“The term
th
‘sweatshop’ was coined in the 19 century in Britain to describe establishments in
unorganised trades where wages and conditions were considered exploitative . . . .”).
2
Maquiladoras, or Export Processing Zones, are defined by the International
Labour Organization (ILO) as “industrial zones with special incentives set up to attract foreign investors.” International Labour Organization, Export Processing
Zones, http://www-ilo-mirror.cornell.edu/public/english/dialogue/sector/themes/
epz.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2007). In the maquilas of Mexico and Central America,
the special incentives are “low wages, a lack of environmental or labour regulations,
low taxes, and few if any duties.” Maquila Solidarity Network, Maquilas: What Is a
Maquila?, http://www.maquilasolidarity.org/resources/maquilas/whatis.htm (last
visited Apr. 4, 2007).
3
See Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3801(b)(1) (Supp.
IV 2004).
The expansion of international trade is vital to the national security of
the United States. Trade is critical to the economic growth and
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the issue of labor conditions in countries viewed as prospective trading partners is inextricably intertwined with the United States’ de4
mocratically rooted philosophy of promoting free trade. As barriers
to trade are reduced due to the proliferation of FTAs, the attendant
duties and obligations of trading partners become an issue of key importance.
In light of the strong efforts to expand international trade and
reduce tariff barriers to American products, the dawn of the twentyfirst century has produced a new era of FTAs between the United
5
6
States and individual countries, as well as collective regions,
throughout the world. August 2, 2005 marked the newest addition to
the ever-expanding list of FTAs as the U.S.-Dominican Republic/Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) was entered
7
into force and became public law.
This Comment addresses the United States’ promulgation and
passage of CAFTA, with particular focus on, and analysis of, the labor
provisions contained therein. Part I discusses the history leading up
to the enactment of CAFTA, including the arguments for and against
8
the agreement. Part II focuses specifically on the labor provisions
and capacity building mechanisms contained in Article 16 of CAFTA,
9
including criticisms and defense of the provisions. Part III provides

strength of the United States and to its leadership in the world. Stable
trading relationships promote security and prosperity. Trade agreements today serve the same purposes that security pacts played during
the Cold War, binding nations together through a series of mutual
rights and obligations. Leadership by the United States in international trade fosters open markets, democracy, and peace throughout
the world.
Id.
4

See id. § 3802(a)(6)–(7). The overall trade negotiating objectives of the United
States include “to promote respect for worker rights and the rights of children consistent with core labor standards . . . and an understanding of the relationship between trade and worker rights.” Id. § 3802(a)(6).
5
See, e.g., Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, Oct. 24,
2000, 41 I.L.M. 63 [hereinafter U.S.-Jordan FTA]; United States–Chile Free Trade
Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, 117 Stat. 909 (2003) [hereinafter U.S.-Chile
FTA]; Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., May 18, 2004, 118
Stat. 919 (2004).
6
See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 8, 1992,
107 Stat. 2057 (1993).
7
Dominican Republic-Central America-U.S. Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 109-53, 119 Stat. 462 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of
19 U.S.C.).
8
See infra Part I.
9
See infra Part II.
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an analysis of the present day labor conditions with which CAFTA
10
must contend. Finally, Part IV tracks the progression of American
FTAs and CAFTA’s place in this succession, and suggests a model of
11
success for crafting the labor provisions of future FTAs.
I.

THE ROAD TO CAFTA

CAFTA, the most recently enacted FTA, encompasses the Central American countries of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, as well as the Caribbean nation of the Domini12
CAFTA represents the Bush administration’s
can Republic.
(“Administration”) focus on promulgating tariff-reducing agreements
13
with a multitude of nations.
The push for establishing FTAs
throughout the world is supported by the objectives outlined by Congress in the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 (TPA,
14
or “fast-track”).
Prior to CAFTA, all of the countries now party to the agreement
were beneficiary countries to the Caribbean Basin Economic Recov15
16
ery Act (CBERA), pursuant to presidential designation.
Under
CBERA, beneficiary countries enjoyed tariff-free exports to the
17
United States for certain articles. In determining whether to designate a nation as a beneficiary country, CBERA outlined various factors for the president to consider in granting beneficiary status:
10

See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
12
19 U.S.C.A. § 4001 (West 2005).
13
See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, STATEMENT ON HOW THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC – CENTRAL AMERICA – UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
MAKES PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING U.S. PURPOSES, POLICIES, OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES 2
(2005), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/Transmit
tal/asset_upload_file122_7816.pdf (“The Agreement forms an integral part of the
Administration’s larger strategy of opening markets around the world through negotiating and concluding global, regional, and bilateral trade initiatives.”).
14
Congress justifies the promulgation of FTAs on the basis that
[t]rade agreements maximize opportunities for the critical sectors and
[are]building blocks of the economy of the United States . . . . Trade
will create new opportunities for the United States and preserve the
unparalleled strength of the United States in economic, political, and
military affairs. The United States, secured by expanding trade and
economic opportunities, will meet the challenges of the twenty-first
century.
19 U.S.C. § 3801(b)(2) (Supp. IV 2004).
15
19 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (2000).
16
Id. § 2702(a)(1)(A).
17
Id. § 2701. “The President may proclaim duty-free treatment (or other preferential treatment) for all eligible articles from any beneficiary country in accordance
with the provisions of this chapter.” Id. § 2701.
11
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1) an expression by such country of its desire to be so designated;
2) the economic conditions in such country, the living standards
of its inhabitants, and any other economic factors which he
deems appropriate;
3) the extent to which such country has assured the United
States it will provide equitable and reasonable access to the
markets and basic commodity resources of such country;
4) the degree to which such country follows the accepted rules
of international trade provided for under the WTO Agreement and the multilateral trade agreements (as such terms
are defined in paragraphs (9) and (4), respectively, of section
2 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act [19 U.S.C. §
3501(9) and (4)]);
5) the degree to which such country uses export subsidies or
imposes export performance requirements or local content
requirements which distort international trade;
6)
the degree to which the trade policies of such country as
they relate to other beneficiary countries are contributing to
the revitalization of the region;
7) the degree to which such country is undertaking self-help
measures to promote its own economic development;
8) whether or not such country has taken or is taking steps to afford to workers in that country (including any designated
zone in that country) internationally recognized worker
18
rights.

Expanding upon the criteria laid out in 19 U.S.C. § 2702, § 2703 further defines these factors, including an assessment of “the extent to
which the country provides internationally recognized worker
19
rights.” These internationally recognized rights include:
(I)
(II)
(III)
(IV)
(V)

the right of association;
the right to organize and bargain collectively;
a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor;
a minimum age for the employment of children; and
acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum
wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and
20
health.

The same above-named factors are also to be considered when determining if a country should be withdrawn or suspended from its

18
19
20

Id. § 2702(c)(1)–(8).
Id. § 2703(b)(5)(B)(iii).
Id. § 2703(b)(5)(B)(iii)(I)–(V).
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21

beneficiary status. CBERA provides a mechanism for the president
to proscribe complete or selective sanctions if a beneficiary country is
22
CBERA
not in compliance with the objectives set forth therein.
therefore, promotes tariff-free imports into the United States, while
at the same time providing for a unilateral withdrawal mechanism by
the United States should a country not comply with levels articulated
23
by CBERA.
To many, CBERA represented a one-sided trade preference program to Central American countries without duty-free reciprocity for
United States goods and services, thereby perpetuating an unequal
playing field between the United States and designated beneficiary
24
countries. In response to this view, early in 2001, Robert Zoellick,
former United States Trade Representative, commenced discussions
21
22

See Id. § 2702(f)(1)(B).
Id. § 2702(e)(1)(A)–(B).
(1)(A) The President may, after the requirements of subsection (a)(2) of this
section and paragraph (2) have been met–
(i) withdraw or suspend the designation of any country as a beneficiary country, or
(ii) withdraw, suspend, or limit the application of duty-free
treatment under this chapter to any article of any country, if, after such
designation, the President determines that as a result of changed circumstances such country would be barred from designation as a beneficiary country under subsection (b) of this section.
(B) The President may, after the requirements of subsection (a)(2)
of this section and paragraph (2) have been met–
(i) withdraw or suspend the designation of any country as a [Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act] beneficiary country; or
(ii) withdraw, suspend, or limit the application of preferential
treatment under section 2703(b)(2) and (3) of this title to any article
of any country, if, after such designation, the President determines
that, as a result of changed circumstances, the performance of such
country is not satisfactory under the criteria set forth in section
2703(b)(5)(B) of this title.

Id.
23

Id.
See Implementation of the Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of
Hon. Peter F. Allgeier, Acting U.S. Trade Rep., Office of the U.S. Trade Rep.), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=3061
[hereinafter Allgeier].
But while these Central American countries and the Dominican Republic buy many goods and services from the United States, we currently face an unlevel playing field. . . . Under unilateral preference
programs begun by President Reagan and expanded under President
Clinton with broad bipartisan support, nearly 80 percent of imports
from Central America and the Dominican Republic already enter the
United States duty-free.
Id.
24
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with Central American leaders for the negotiation of a regional FTA
between the countries and the United States for reciprocity of duty25
free imports and exports. Thereafter, on “January 16, 2002, President George W. Bush announced his administration’s objective to
explore a free trade agreement . . . with the five countries that are
26
members of the Central American Common Market.”
The motivations for the enactment of CAFTA are numerous and
27
varied from the United States’ perspective. The principal goal of
CAFTA, however, is that it forms a “part of the broader US strategy of
‘competitive liberalization’ as well as of supporting democratic developments in the Western Hemisphere and building economic alli28
ances with countries crucial to US national security.”
The United States’ emphasis of building economic alliances
manifests itself to the utmost degree in the proposed, yet highly debated, Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), which seeks
to establish an FTA with all of Central and South America, as well as
29
Caribbean nations. CAFTA represents an alternative approach to
30
FTAA. Many argue, however, that CAFTA is a “divide and conquer”
approach because of failed FTAA negotiations due to lack of support
for the broad agreement from important countries such as Brazil,
31
Venezuela, and Uruguay. Additionally, it has been argued that this
strategy “lessens the scope of coalitions negotiating the FTAA and
puts tremendous stress on the remaining countries to get in line after
32
. . . Central America.”
The competing perspectives on the motivations for CAFTA are
also indicative of the diverse opinions in the U.S. legislature over

25

José M. Salazar-Xirinachs & Jaime Granados, The US–Central America Free Trade
Agreement: Opportunities and Challenges, in FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: US STRATEGIES AND
PRIORITIES 225 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2004).
26
Id.
27
Id. at 229–30.
28
Id. (citing Robert Zoellick, US Trade Rep., Globalization, Trade, and Econ. Security, Remarks at the Nat’l Press Club (Oct. 1, 2000).
29
Jeffrey J. Schott, Assessing US FTA Policy, in FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: US
STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES 361 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., Inst. For Int’l Econ. 2004). See
also Salazar-Xirinachs & Grenados, supra note 25, at 234 (“The number of players
and the accompanying proliferation of sensitivities ensure that the FTAA is an ambitious and complex negotiation, and its precise outcome remains uncertain.”).
30
Id. at 230.
31
See SCOTT SINCLAIR & KEN TRAYNOR, PUBLIC SERVICES INTERNATIONAL, DIVIDE AND
CONQUER: THE FTAA, US TRADE STRATEGY, AND PUBLIC SERVICES IN THE AMERICAS, at iii
(2004), available at http://www.world-psi.org/TemplateEn.cfm?Section=Home&
Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=4145.
32
Salazar-Xirinachs & Granados, supra note 25, at 230 n.2.
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whether or not CAFTA was a viable and supportable agreement.
Beginning with the narrow passage of the TPA in 2002, which restored so-called “fast-track” negotiating authority for trade agree34
ments to the president, the road to negotiating and approving
agreements such as CAFTA has been dramatically split between sup35
porters and opponents. Fast-track negotiations allow “the president
[to] submit the trade agreement and legislation making the necessary
changes in domestic law, and Congress [can] vote expeditiously on
36
the package without the possibility of amendment.” President Bush
ardently pushed for restoration of fast-track negotiation ability, arguing that “Trade Promotion Authority will give me the flexibility I
need to secure the greatest possible trade opportunities for America’s
37
farmers, workers, families and consumers.” However, many members of Congress, especially Democrats, were nervous at the prospect
of restoring such broad trade negotiating powers, giving the “presi38
dent open-ended authority to negotiate trade deals as he sees fit.”
The divide between Democrats and Republicans in both the
House of Representatives and the Senate continued to characterize
39
the road to the passage of CAFTA. It could be argued that the skepticism of the president’s increased trade negotiation authority of the
TPA carried over into the debate regarding CAFTA, possibly leading
to stricter scrutiny of the proposal of CAFTA, the first FTA negotiated
40
post-TPA.
In addition to granting fast-track authority, the TPA lays out specific trade negotiating objectives and designates the groups to be involved in the negotiation of trade agreements and the sequence of

33

Joseph Kahn, House Supports Trade Authority Sought by Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,
2001, at A1.
34
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116
Stat. 933 (2002); see also CIS No. PL2002-107-210, Div. B (The TPA “[r]estores and
modifies Presidential authority to negotiate trade agreements under an expedited
procedure for Congressional approval.”).
35
See Kahn, supra note 33 (reporting that TPA passed approval in the House by a
narrow vote of 215 to 214).
36
DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, FREE TRADE UNDER FIRE 171 (2002).
37
Kahn, supra note 33 at A1.
38
Id. (Democrats arguing that TPA “failed to mandate that trade agreements set
labor and environmental standards as well as tariff and quota levels”).
39
See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Pleas and Promises by G.O.P. as Trade Pact Wins by 2
Votes, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2005, at A1 (“[T]he House approved the trade pact by the
paper-thin margin of two votes, 217 to 215.”); Edmund L. Andrews, Senate Approves
Free Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2005, at A1 (reporting that Senate approved
CAFTA by a vote of fifty-four to forty-five).
40
See infra notes 46–61 and accompanying text.
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41

events for proposal of an FTA. Other than the president, the major
actors in the process of trade negotiation prior to submission for
congressional approval include the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and the Labor Advisory Committee for Trade Negotia42
tions and Trade Policy (LAC). On October 1, 2002 the USTR officially notified Congress of the intent to pursue an FTA with countries
of Central America, and on August 4, 2003, the USTR amended its
notification to integrate the Dominican Republic into the agreement
43
as well.
On February 20, 2004, the President informed Congress of his
intent to sign the proposed agreement with the Central American
countries, and on March 24, 2004, he apprised Congress that the
44
agreement would include the Dominican Republic. Pursuant to the
provisions of the TPA, the president must inform the LAC of his in45
tent to submit a trade agreement to Congress. The LAC then reviews the proposed agreement and compiles a report adjudging
46
whether the objectives of the TPA have been met. On March 19,
2004, the LAC submitted its report regarding the proposed CAFTA
bill:
It is the opinion of the LAC that CAFTA neither fully meets the
negotiating objectives laid out by Congress in TPA, nor promotes
the economic interest of the United States. The agreement
clearly fails to meet some congressional negotiating objectives,
and it barely complies with others. The agreement repeats many
of the same mistakes of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and is likely to lead to the same deteriorating
trade balances, lost jobs, and workers’ rights violations that
47
NAFTA has created.

41

19 U.S.C. § 3803 (Supp. IV 2004).
Id.
43
Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act, H.R. REP. NO. 109-182, at 8–9 (2005), as reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 337, 344 [hereinafter Ways and Means Report].
44
Id.
45
§ 3803(c)(3)(A).
46
Id. § 3803(c)(3)(A)(i).
47
LABOR ADVISORY COMMITEE FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AND TRADE POLICY, REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS AND THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE ON
THE U.S.-CENTRAL AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 1 (2004), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA_Reports/
asset_upload_file63_5935.pdf [hereinafter LAC REPORT].
42
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Despite the negative opinion from the LAC and its recommendation
to change the agreement, CAFTA was submitted for congressional
48
approval largely unmodified from its original form.
CAFTA was officially introduced in the House on June 23, 2005,
49
and referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means. The
vote of the Committee yielded twenty-five votes in favor of the bill
and sixteen votes in opposition. The majority, therefore, recommended the bill for House approval, stating:
The Committee believes that the Agreement meets the objectives
and priorities set forth in the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 (TPA). The Agreement covers all agricultural and
industrial sectors, opens DR-CAFTA markets to U.S. services, contains robust protections for U.S. investors and intellectual property rights holders, and includes strong labor and environment
provisions. In addition to the new commercial opportunities, DRCAFTA will help cement many of the recent democratic, legal,
50
and economic reforms in the DR-CAFTA countries.

The minority of the House Committee on Ways and Means expressed
their dissenting view by referring to the Administration’s proposed
bill as a “missed opportunity . . . to negotiate and submit to Congress
for approval an agreement that would have ensured that the benefits
of trade flow broadly to working people, small farmers and society at
51
large, as well as to larger businesses.” The distinctly different conclusions of the LAC, the minority of the House Committee on Ways
and Means, and the majority of the Committee, in determining
whether CAFTA, as proposed, was in compliance with the objectives
of United States trade policy would prove to be a contentious issue on
52
the House floor as well.
The House, as well as the Senate, was largely split regarding the
desirability of implementing CAFTA, especially concerning labor
53
provisions and the withdrawal of countries that were parties to
54
CAFTA from CBERA. The multitude of opposing and supporting
48

See Ways and Means Report, supra note 43, at 1.
151 CONG. REC. H5100 (daily ed. June 23, 2005).
50
Ways and Means Report, supra note 43, at 2.
51
Id.
52
See Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act, 151 CONG. REC. H6884 (daily ed. July 27, 2005) (statements of
Rep. Thomas et al.).
53
Id.
54
CBERA was amended to provide that upon passage of CAFTA, any country that
is a party to CAFTA would be withdrawn automatically from CBERA and subject
strictly to the provisions of CAFTA. (“The term ‘former beneficiary country’ means a
country that ceases to be designated as a beneficiary country under this title because
49
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sentiments of CAFTA culminated on July 27, 2005, with a volatile
floor debate between strong Democratic and Republican representatives, echoing the divergent views of the House Committee on Ways
55
and Means. Representative Cardin from Maryland was opposed to
CAFTA, principally with regard to its labor provisions, stating:
This will be the first agreement that I will vote against.
This is the first agreement in which we actually move backwards on advancing international labor standards. Currently, with
the Central American countries, we had the Caribbean Basin Initiative. . . . They get preference. But in order to get that preference, they must move towards international labor standards. . . .
We use the threat of withholding trade benefits if they do not
adopt international labor standards . . . and it is working. . . .
CAFTA repeals those obligations. . . . [W]hat is in place is enforc56
ing your own rules without any adequate enforcement.

Representative Cardin’s argument, however, was strongly rebutted by
a host of CAFTA supporters, including Representative Moran from
Virginia, positing that without CAFTA the conditions of Central
America would continue to deteriorate:
[F]rom the standpoint of policy, certainly this could and should
have been a much better agreement. We should have addressed
labor conditions in a more robust way. . . . But on the whole this
agreement does much more for Central America than we will
have the opportunity to do in a long time to come, and that is the
57
reality.

Representative Davis of Alabama responded that without CAFTA the
United States would not be assisting the countries of Central America, positing:
[I]nstead of taking these nations that struggle so much day in and
day out, instead of challenging them to move to a better place, we
gave up and we accepted the status quo. And one of the cruelest
and strangest arguments . . . is that somehow we are not standing
58
by these countries if we defeat this agreement.

Compelling arguments from both sides emerged in the debate over
the passage of CAFTA, and at the end of the debates CAFTA passed

the country has become a party to a free trade agreement with the United States.”).
19 U.S.C.A. § 2702(a)(1)(F) (West 2005).
55
See 151 CONG. REC. H6884 (daily ed. July 27, 2005) (statements of Rep. Thomas
et al.).
56
Id. at H6897 (statement of Rep. Cardin).
57
Id. (statement of Rep. Moran).
58
Id. at H6908 (statement of Rep. Davis).
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in the House by the narrowest of margins: 217 to 215, with two ab59
staining.
Rapidly thereafter, the bill officially passed in the Senate by a
vote of fifty-four to forty-five and was presented to the President on
60
July 28, 2005.
The President signed the bill on August 2, 2005,
61
bringing CAFTA into force under Public Law 109-53. CAFTA is now
officially codified under Title 19, chapter 26 of the United States
62
Code, section 4001.
II

CAFTA LABOR PROVISIONS AND CONCERNS

The contentious debate seen in the House, and to a lesser extent
in the Senate, necessitates a closer examination of the labor provisions of CAFTA that created such strong dissention to the agreement.
The preamble to CAFTA lists, among other objectives, that the countries resolve to “[protect], enhance, and enforce basic workers’ rights
and strengthen their cooperation on labor matters . . . [and build] on
63
their respective international commitments on labor.” Specifically,
the labor provisions are contained in chapter 16, which details the
countries’ statement of shared commitment, provisions for enforcement of labor laws, as well as an annex outlining labor cooperation
64
and capacity building.
The overarching labor requirement of CAFTA is that the countries “reaffirm their obligations as members of the International Labor Organization (ILO) . . . [and] strive to ensure that such labor
65
principles . . . are recognized and protected by its law.” The ILO
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work are essentially incorporated into the definition of labor laws in CAFTA; they include:
(a) the right of association;
(b) the right to organize and bargain collectively;
(c) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory
labor;

59

Id. at H6927–28.
151 CONG. REC. S9253 (daily ed. July 28, 2005).
61
Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act, 109 Pub. L. No. 53, 119 Stat. 462 (2005).
62
19 U.S.C.A. § 4001 (West 2005).
63
Central America-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement,
Preamble (Aug. 5, 2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/
Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DR_Final_Texts/Section_Index.html?ht=
[hereinafter CAFTA].
64
Id. ch. 16.
65
Id. ch. 16.1, para. 1.
60
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(d) a minimum age for the employment of children and the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labor; and
(e) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum
66
wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.

CAFTA also recognizes, however, the sovereignty of each country
party to the agreement and therefore allows for “the right of each
Party to establish its own domestic labor standards,” but requires that
“its laws provide for labor standards consistent with the internation67
ally recognized labor rights” established by the ILO.
The essential criticism regarding the basic minimum labor requirements called for by CAFTA is that, even though Central American countries are parties to the ILO and have signed onto the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the actual
practices in the countries fall far below achievement of this stan68
dard.
Congresswoman Jackson-Lee of Texas opposed CAFTA on
the basis that “omission of labor standards will result in continuation
of awful and unconscionable labor conditions for both adults and
69
children.”
The rebuttal to this argument is that there has been great progress made by the Central American countries to raise their labor
70
standards as their democracies emerge and continue to strengthen.
Supporters of CAFTA note that each of the Central American countries has incorporated into their constitutions and civil law systems
the core ILO standards and contend that they will continue to pro71
gress by being parties to CAFTA. The argument about the existence
or non-existence of effective labor laws, however, inherently calls into
question the enforceability of such laws.
CAFTA enforcement provisions require that:
(a)

66

A Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its labor laws
through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction,

Id. ch. 16.8, paras. (a)–(e).
Id. ch. 16.1, para. 2.
68
See LAC REPORT, supra note 47, at 3 (“Under CAFTA, governments in Central
America will be free to maintain their labor laws far below ILO standards.”).
69
151 CONG. REC. H6884, H6912 (daily ed. July 27, 2005) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee).
70
See Allgeier, supra note 24 (“Administration’s own, more detailed analysis of
the labor rights situation . . . confirms that their labor laws are generally ILOconsistent.”).
71
See INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, INT’L LABOUR ORG., FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND
RIGHTS AT WORK: A LABOUR LAW STUDY: COSTA RICA, EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA,
HONDURAS, AND NICARAGUA (2003), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/
dialogue/download/cafta.pdf.
67
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in a manner affecting trade between the Parties, after the
date of entry into force of this Agreement.
(b) Each Party retains the right to exercise discretion with respect
to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance
matters and to make decisions, regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement with respect to other labor matters
determined to have higher priorities. Accordingly, the Parties understand that a Party is in compliance with subparagraph (a) where a course of action or inaction reflects a reasonable exercise of such discretion, or results from a bona fide
72
decision regarding the allocation of resources.

CAFTA’s enforcement measures require only that countries enforce
73
their own labor standards, not that they create or upgrade any laws.
The opponents of CAFTA worry that requiring only the enforcement
of current laws amounts to an endorsement of the current sub74
standard labor conditions in Central American countries. The dissenting opinion from the House Committee on Ways and Means
criticized the CAFTA enforcement requirements by stating, “even the
best enforcement of inadequate laws can never yield acceptable
75
results.”
Additionally, CAFTA outlines the available recourse should a
76
country fail to enforce its existing laws. The first step in dispute
resolution for labor violations begins with government-to-government
consultations, progressing then to discussion between labor ministers
77
of the respective countries. If the labor ministers cannot agree on a
78
course of action, the matter is referred to an arbitral panel. CAFTA
provides for the establishment of a roster of individuals to serve as
79
panelists in matters of labor dispute. Labor roster members are to
80
81
be chosen on an objective basis, not to be affiliated with any party,
72

CAFTA, supra note 63, ch. 16.2, paras. 1(a)–(b).
See id. ch. 16.1, para. 2 (“[r]ecognizing the right of each Party to establish its
own domestic labor standards”).
74
See Ways and Means Report, supra note 43, at 47–50 (arguing that “[r]equiring
only that countries ‘enforce their own laws’ with regard to labor standards is equally
inappropriate”).
75
Id. at 50.
76
See CAFTA, supra note 63, ch. 20.
77
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, CAFTA FACTS: DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT: EQUIVALENT PROCEDURES & REMEDIES FOR COMMERCIAL AND LABOR
DISPUTES 1 (2005), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/
CAFTA/Briefing_Book/asset_upload_file812_7869.pdf.
78
Id.
79
CAFTA, supra note 63, ch. 16, art. 16.7, para. 1.
80
Id. para. 2(b).
81
Id. para. 2(c).
73
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and to “have expertise or experience in labor law or its enforcement,
international trade, or the resolution of disputes arising under inter82
national agreements.”
The panel then conducts a review of the alleged labor viola83
tion. If the panel finds that a country is not in compliance with the
labor standards, the parties themselves have a chance to determine
84
the appropriate resolution. If no resolution is to be had, then a
monetary penalty of up to fifteen million dollars annually may be im85
posed until the violating country comes into compliance. The fine
paid will be deposited in a fund whereby the monies shall be used for
86
appropriate labor initiatives in the country of the violating party. If
the party in violation fails to pay the fine, the complaining party may
take steps to collect the monies due, including temporary suspension
87
of tariff benefits equivalent to the value of the fine. However, the
decision to suspend trade benefits should only be made bearing in
mind the “objective of eliminating barriers to trade and while seeking
to avoid unduly affecting parties or interests not party to the dis88
pute.”
The labor violation remedies under CAFTA are markedly different from the unilateral sanction provisions in its predecessor,
89
CBERA.
Unilateral trade preference programs, such as CBERA,
provide stricter standards of enforcement than those found in
CAFTA because they allow for “the withdrawal of trade benefits if
90
Opposteps are not taken to meet international labor standards.”
nents to CAFTA cite the success of the sanction imposition measures
contained in CBERA, noting that “most of the labor law reforms of
the past twenty years in the CAFTA countries has been due to the lev91
erage of workers rights conditionality under [CBERA].” As previously mentioned, however, supporters of CAFTA view CBERA as an
unequal trade preference program because the United States does
not receive reciprocal reduced tariff exports to Central American
92
countries.
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

Id. para. 2(a).
CAFTA, supra note 63, ch. 20, art. 20.13, paras. 3(a)–(c).
Id. art. 20.15, para. 3.
Id. art. 20.17, para. 2.
Id. para. 4.
Id. para. 5.
Id.
See 19 U.S.C. § 2703(e)(1)(A)–(B) (2000); see also supra note 22.
LAC Report, supra note 47 at 10.
Ways and Means Report, supra note 43, at 49.
Allgeier, supra note 24.
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Critics of CAFTA take issue with its enforcement provisions, arguing that (1) the maximum fine for a labor violation is capped exceedingly low at fifteen million dollars and (2) any fine paid is actually returned to the violating country, in essence paying themselves
for their own violations, with little supervision for fund appropria93
tion. Supporters of CAFTA counter that a fifteen million dollar fine
is a significant amount to the developing countries of Central America and that the threat of having to pay this fine until the situation is
rectified is a powerful incentive to uphold the obligation of enforcing
94
their domestic labor laws.
Additionally, supporters of CAFTA point to the unique “Capacity
Building” provisions embodied in Article 16 to reinforce their position that CAFTA actually does more for workers’ rights than other
95
FTAs. CAFTA recognizes that “cooperation on labor issues can play
an important role in advancing development in the territory of the
96
Parties and in providing opportunities to improve labor standards.”
Annex 16.5 provides for the creation of a Labor Cooperation and
Capacity Building Mechanism (CBM), composed of contact points
97
from each country. The purpose of the CBM is to “initiate bilateral
98
or regional cooperative activities on labor issues,” addressing issues
99
such as the effective application of the ILO fundamental rights, out100
lining inspection systems to improve labor enforcement, and appropriate methods for supervising compliance of working condi101
tions.
The annex additionally suggests certain means for the
implementation of cooperative activities, although the parties may
102
agree to use whatever means they deem appropriate, as long as the
means “operate in a manner that respects each Party’s law and sover103
eignty.” Opponents to CAFTA acknowledge that while these provisions are “crafted to encourage enforcement of labor rights, [they]
fall short of the strength needed to reverse years of indifference and

93

LAC Report, supra note 47, at 12 (“[L]abor enforcement procedures cap the
maximum amount of fines and sanctions available at an unacceptably low level, and
allow violators to pay fines to themselves with little oversight.”).
94
See Ways and Means Report, supra note 43, at 42.
95
Id. at 43.
96
CAFTA, supra note 63, ch. 16, art. 16.5, para. 1.
97
Id. Annex 16.5, para. 1.
98
Id. para. 3.
99
Id. para. 3(a).
100
Id. para. 3(d).
101
Id. para. 3(g).
102
CAFTA, supra note 63, ch. 16, annex 16.5, para. 4.
103
Id. para. 1.
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104

systematic neglect.”
This neglect is embodied in “bureaucratic im105
pediments, ineffective legal systems and insufficient resources” such
that the CBM’s potential for success is reduced because the benefit of
CAFTA is given before workers rights are firmly rooted in Central
106
American countries.
III.

THE FUTURE FOR FTAS

The construction and content of CAFTA differ from its predecessor FTAs, evidencing an acknowledgement that the past models
were not successful in securing adherence to labor standards. These
changes, although progressive, constitute a mere starting place for
the structuring of future FTAs. This foundation, coupled with further restructuring, will ensure that labor rights espoused in prospective agreements are given a stronger chance of effectuation. This final section of the Comment will briefly survey the character of FTA
evolution, outline CAFTA similarities and differences to these agreements, and suggest a model on which future FTAs should be based.
A. Evolution of FTAs
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was the
first U.S. FTA to recognize the inherent connection between trade
and labor, outlining certain provisions in the North American
107
Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC). The NAALC is a side
agreement to NAFTA that details the labor requirements of the
108
agreement, although not in the main agreement itself.
The
NAALC set the stage for future FTAs’ recognition of labor provisions;
however, it is unique in that the evolution of FTAs progressed away
from side agreements that outlined the labor provisions (such as the
NAALC) to an actual incorporation of the labor standards into the
109
main body of the agreements.
Although NAFTA initiated the awareness of labor rights, the
substantive provisions of the NAALC are distinct from the provisions

104

151 CONG. REC. H6884, H6919 (daily ed. July 27, 2005) (statement of Rep. Van
Hollen).
105
Id.
106
See id.
107
See HEPPLE, supra note 1, at 107.
108
Id.
109
See id. (NAFTA and the NAALC “have been the model, with some significant
variations, for later [FTAs] negotiated by the US with Jordan (2000), Chile and Singapore (2003) , . . . Australia (2004), and . . . [CAFTA].”); see also id. at 116.
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110

of future FTAs, including CAFTA.
The NAALC’s main focus was
on the “enforcement of domestic labour law by each of the parties, and
111
The main
not the application of international labour standards.”
obligations of parties to the NAALC include the establishment and
maintenance of high labor standards, the promotion of compliance
and public awareness, and the effective enforcement of domestic la112
bor laws. Although these obligations appear stringent, the purpose
113
behind NAFTA/NAALC did not facilitate strict adherence, as there
are certain glosses throughout the NAALC that temper adherence to
the obligations. For example, Article 49(1) provides that a state has
not failed to effectively enforce its labor laws if the state makes a
“bona fide decision[] to allocate resources to . . . other labour mat114
ters determined to have higher priorities.”
The evolution of FTAs has built upon the foundational elements
established by the NAALC principles and heightened the labor provi115
sions prescribed.
One of the most significant changes is the incorporation of labor standards directly into the main body of the agreement:
The US-Jordan FTA . . . is the first to contain labour rights and
environmental obligations in the text of the main agreement instead of a side agreement. The significance of this is that disputes
over labour rights are subject to the same dispute settlement pro116
cedures and remedies as the rest of the agreement.

The U.S.-Jordan FTA set the stage for incorporating labor provisions
directly into the agreement as reflected in the subsequent U.S.-Chile,
117
U.S.-Singapore, and U.S.-Australia FTAs, as well as in CAFTA.

110

See id. at 108.
Id.
112
See HEPPLE, supra note 1, at 112–13.
113
Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Ben Goodrich, Lessons from NAFTA, in FREE TRADE
AGREEMENTS: US STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES 37, 45–46 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2004)
(“The labor side agreement is little more than a toothless list of hopes and aspirations.”).
114
HEPPLE, supra note 1, at 113–14.
115
See Marianne Hogan, Note, DR-CAFTA Prescribes a Poison Pill: Remedying the Inadequacies of Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement Labor Provisions,
39 SUFFOLK U. L. Rev. 511, 523–27, 532–34 (2006). For examples of FTAs that have
built upon the NAALC structure, see Agreement on Trade in Textiles and Textile
Products, U.S.-Cambodia, Jan. 20, 1999, Hein’s No. KAV 5781[hereinafter CBTA];
U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 5; U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 5; U.S.-Singapore Free
Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026.
116
HEPPLE, supra note 1, at 116.
117
Id. at 117.
111
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Furthermore, the U.S.-Jordan agreement slightly, though quite
significantly, expanded the scope of labor provisions by not only prescribing enforcement of domestic labor laws (as called for in
NAFTA/NAALC), but also by expressly linking domestic labor law
118
standards to international standards called for by the ILO.
The
U.S.-Jordan FTA calls for the “parties . . . to strive to ensure that such
[domestic] labour principles and the internationally recognised labour rights set out in Article 6(6) of the agreement are ‘recognised
119
and protected by domestic labour law.’” This provision may help to
strengthen the focus on international labor standards and a uniformity among labor standards between the parties to the agreement;
however, because the language of “striving to ensure” recognition is
merely aspirational, it has been suggested that “the mortar ‘may be
120
too thin and watery to do the job’ of closing the gaps in NAALC.”
One of the most distinct features of the U.S.-Jordan FTA is the
compliance measures available should a party derogate from the la121
bor provisions established by the agreement. The U.S.-Jordan FTA
first calls for all disputes to be referred to a Joint Committee and then
122
subsequently a dispute settlement panel. If no resolution by either
the Joint Committee or the dispute settlement panel is to be had,
“the affected Party shall be entitled to take any appropriate and com123
mensurate measure.” This provision gives wide latitude to the injured
party to respond with open-ended sanctions, benefit withdrawal, or
any other “appropriate” measure for an indefinite period of time and
124
As shall be seen, the FTAs that
with no dollar amount limitation.
followed the U.S.-Jordan agreement regressed from this broad standard and more narrowly tailored the availability and magnitude of
125
penalties on parties who violate labor standards.
B. The CAFTA Phase
CAFTA has followed suit with the FTAs that were established after the U.S.-Jordan agreement. CAFTA provisions have progressed
from original NAALC standards by first incorporating the labor re118

Id. at 116.
Id.
120
Id. at 117 (citing Marley S. Weiss, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back—or Vice Versa:
Labor Rights Under Free Trade Agreements from NAFTA, Through Jordan, via Chile, to Latin
America, and Beyond, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 689, 718 (2003)).
121
See HEPPLE, supra note 1, at 118.
122
U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 5, art. 17, para. 1.
123
Id. art. 17, para. 2(b) (emphasis added).
124
See HEPPLE, supra note 1, at 117.
125
See infra Part IV.B.
119
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quirements directly into the main agreement, following suit of the
126
Furthermore, although the conU.S.-Jordan FTA and its progeny.
struction of CAFTA has retained the NAALC’s promotion of state
sovereignty over labor laws, CAFTA, like the U.S.-Jordan FTA, has
also incorporated international labor standards into the agreement
127
This is especially significant as
by recognition of ILO Principles.
the “[eleven] labour principles in NAALC are similar to but not the
same as those in ILO conventions. They are less specific and some128
As noted above, however, the
times lower than ILO obligations.”
actual effectiveness of this recognition is limited by the aspirational
129
language of “striving to ensure,” as well as by the retention of an escape clause that provides an out even if a party does violate the stan130
dards called for in the agreement.
Although CAFTA in many ways mirrors the U.S.-Jordan FTA, it
does depart from this model in a very significant way. Agreements
subsequent to the U.S.-Jordan FTA, including CAFTA, relaxed the
131
permissible party responses to the derogation of labor rights.
CAFTA greatly restricts the availability and magnitude of penalties
132
available should a party violate the labor provisions.
CAFTA calls
for enforcement measures to be taken when a party “fail[s] to effec133
tively enforce its labor laws . . . in a manner affecting trade.”
Whereas the U.S.-Jordan agreement does not have a ceiling for the
134
amount of fine imposed, under CAFTA the imposition of fines on
the offending party is capped at fifteen million dollars per year, ad135
justed for inflation. Additionally, where the U.S.-Jordan FTA does
136
not limit the time, duration, or magnitude of benefit withdrawal,
CAFTA prescribes that benefits may only be suspended for failure to
126

See CAFTA, supra note 63, ch. 16
Id. art. 16.1 para. 2.
128
HEPPLE, supra note 1, at 114.
129
See supra note 120.
130
HEPPLE, supra note 1, at 114. This escape clause states that a party does not violate domestic or international labor standards if it can show that the derogation of
labor rights was a result of a bona fide decision regarding the allocation of resources
or a reasonable exercise of discretion over matters determined to have higher priorities. CAFTA, supra note 63, ch. 16, art. 16.2, para. 1(b).
131
See HEPPLE, supra note 1, at 114.
132
See CAFTA, supra note 63, ch. 20.
133
CAFTA, supra note 63, ch. 16, art. 16.2, para. 1(a).
134
U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 5, art. 17 (noting the absence of any monetary
limit on enforcement measures).
135
CAFTA, supra note 63, ch. 20, art. 20.17, para. 2.
136
U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 5, art. 17, para. 2(b) (The US-Jordan FTA only
calls for a reasonableness standard where “the affected Party shall be entitled to take
any appropriate and commensurate measures.”).
127
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comply with the payment of fines and the monetary value of benefits
137
suspended may not exceed the value of the outstanding fine.
CAFTA is also distinct from the U.S.-Jordan FTA in that it calls
138
for a CBM, annexed to the labor provisions. The CBM outlines the
principal functions, capacity building priorities and implementation
of cooperative activities between the parties with regard to labor co139
operation. The CBM further integrates international standards for
140
labor by advocating that the parties seek support from the ILO,
undertake cooperative labor activities regarding the ILO’s fundamen141
142
tal principles, and work cooperatively on labor issues.
C. Recipe for Success in FTAs
Although CAFTA has progressed substantially from its predecessor NAFTA/NAALC, as well as the more contemporary agreements
such as the U.S.-Jordan FTA, CAFTA should not be used as an exact
model for future FTAs. As Howard Rosen notes, “FTAs become obsolete as soon as they are signed. Most agreements look to the past and
143
do not anticipate the future,” and it is therefore important to have
a strong agreement at the outset. As FTAs inevitably proliferate,
measures are needed to effectively shape future agreements. Key
components to the structuring of future FTAs include agreements
conditioned on greater institutional upgrading prior to concluding
an FTA, deeper integration of internationally recognized labor rights
and human rights into the agreements, and a wider latitude of enforcement measures in the agreements themselves. In developing a
successful model for efficient and effective labor rights, recourse to
the provisions of other FTAs, both domestic and international, provides helpful insight to the structuring of the ideal FTA.
The countries party to the agreement need to have sufficient institutional capacity to take full advantage of being a member to an
144
FTA.
This necessarily requires that parties make the requisite investment into institutions linked to labor to insure the compliance

137

See CAFTA, supra note 63, ch. 20, art. 20.17, para. 5.
CAFTA, supra note 63, ch. 16, Annex 16.5.
139
Id.
140
Id. para. 2(d).
141
Id. para. 3.
142
Id. para. 4.
143
Howard Rosen, Free Trade Agreements as Foreign Policy Tools: The US-Israel and USJordan FTAs, in FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: US STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES 51, 75 (Jeffrey
J. Schott, ed., 2004).
144
See Salazar-Xirinachs & Granados, supra note 25, at 262.
138
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145

with the provisions laid out in an FTA.
Such investment includes
improving “the rule of law, the judicial system, and corporate govern146
ance and social responsibility.” One way to accomplish this institutional upgrading is by integrating provisions into the FTA that reward
countries with increasing preferential trade treatment for their demonstrable improvements in labor and working conditions.
The Cambodia Bilateral Textile Agreement (CBTA) is an example of a domestic trade agreement that incorporates such condi147
tions. The labor standards set forth in the CBTA provide that:
The Parties seek to create new employment opportunities and
improve living standards and working conditions through an enhanced trading relationship; affirm respect for each Party’s legal
system and seeking to ensure that labor laws and regulations provide for high quality and productive workplaces; and seek to foster transparency in the administration of labor law, promote
compliance with, and effective enforcement of, existing labor law,
and promote the general labor rights embodied in the Cambo148
dian labor code.

To this end, the Cambodian government shall undertake to “support
the implementation of a program to improve working conditions in
the textile and apparel sector, including internationally recognized
149
core labor standards.” The agreement further calls for semi-annual
consultations between the governments to determine the progress of
150
“If the United States makes a positive
program implementation.
determination” that “working conditions . . . substantially comply with
such labor law and standards . . . , then the Specific Limits [on Cambodian annual exports] shall be increased by 14 percent for the
151
Agreement Year . . . .”
This increase will only be sustained or increased in following years upon subsequent positive determina152
If Cambodia fails “to take major action resulting in a signifitions.

145

Id. at 262–63 (“Improving compliance with international labor . . . standards
first and foremost needs substantive investments in institutional capacities and in a
variety of specific projects.”).
146
Id. at 263 (Improvement in institutional capacity building is required for countries to “attract sufficient investment to grow and take full advantage of the new market access opened up by [an FTA].”).
147
CBTA, supra note 115.
148
Id. art. 10, para. A.
149
Id. para. B.
150
Id. para. D.
151
Id.
152
Id. art. 10, para. D.
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cant change in working conditions, then the . . . United States may
153
withdraw such an increase.”
Another essential step to strengthening the labor provisions of
FTAs is not only the recognition of international labor standards, but
also the inclusion of human rights protection in general. In this regard the external trade agreements of the European Union (EU)
provide a helpful model for the incorporation of human rights into
FTAs. Most notably, the Cotonou Agreement, signed in June 2000 in
Cotonou, Benin, is a partnership agreement between the African,
Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP) and the EU, including,
among other objectives, trade preferences between the blocks of
154
states.
The preamble to the Cotonou Agreement details the parties’ willingness to implement a “comprehensive and integrated approach for a strengthened partnership . . . [including] trade rela155
As part of this “integrated approach,” the preamble
tions.”
incorporates reference to various human rights documents, including
the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
156
Article Nine further delineates the essential
Rights, among others.
elements of the agreement which include “[r]espect for all human
rights and fundamental freedoms, including respect for fundamental
social rights, democracy based on the rule of law and transparent and
accountable governance [as] an integral part of sustainable develop157
ment.” In addition to the human rights clauses, the agreement also
158
contains provisions for recognition of ILO standards.
153
CBTA, supra note 115, art. 10, para. D. The success of these provisions is demonstrated by the proactive involvement and desire of the United States and Cambodia to effectuate the agreement. After the passage of CBTA, the United States and
Cambodia jointly requested the ILO’s assistance in monitoring the Cambodian textile and apparel sector. HEPPLE, supra note 1, at 116. The ILO project undertook to
observe and aid the institutional capacity of the Cambodian government to improve
working conditions in these sectors. Id. The ILO endeavor was characterized by a
tripartite Project Advisory Committee, which required that in order for businesses to
be eligible for the heightened export quotas, they had to register their factories with
the Committee. Id. at 121. In addition, these registered factories must allow the ILO
inspectors access to monitor their facilities and interact with the workers. Id. To
date, the ILO has discovered evidence of incorrect wage payment, involuntary overtime, and anti-union discrimination. Id. Although the ILO inspectors lack enforcement capabilities, “their work has resulted in improvements in a number of factories.” Id. at 121–22.
154
Partnership Agreement Between the Members of the African, Caribbean and
Pacific Group and the European Community and its Member States, 2000 O.J.
L317/3, art. 36, para. 1 [hereinafter Cotonou Agreement].
155
Id. Preamble.
156
Id.
157
Id. art. 9, para. 1.
158
Id. art. 50.
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The significance of this two-pronged incorporation and reference to human rights is that “a grave breach of human rights or democratic principles by one party would entitle the other to terminate
159
the [agreement] or to suspend its operation in whole or in part.”
The Cotonou Agreement also calls for a sixty-day consultation period
and that any measures taken must be “in accordance with international law, and proportional to the violation,” with suspension as a
160
This higher level of adherence, not only to labor, but
last resort.
also to human rights standards, has given the parties to the Cotonou
Agreement more latitude when violations of the rights of citizens oc161
cur.
Enforceability of the designated international standards is also a
key issue in structuring an FTA’s labor standards. Although most
FTAs acknowledge an international standard for labor rights, these
provisions have “often been [seen] as aspirational standards to be
162
achieved rather than actual commitments to be enforced.”
In this
vein, stringent enforcement measures are needed to better effectuate
the labor provisions of an agreement, rendering them more than
mere recitations.
The pinnacle of enforceability is “fully enforceable labor obligations that enjoy the same status as commercial and other obligations
163
of the relevant trade agreement.” As an example, NAFTA/NAALC
provide only that certain labor standards outlined are subject to pen164
alties, instead of across-the-board enforceability of all provisions.
This undermines the strength of the labor provisions by making the
165
commitment “to protect . . . rights merely hortatory.”
Therefore,
the strongest agreements are those that provide non-discriminatory
enforcement, with a wide choice of enforcement mechanisms.

159

HEPPLE, supra note 1, at 122 (citation omitted).
Cotonou Agreement, supra note 154, art. 96, paras. 2(a)–(c).
161
See HEPPLE, supra note 1, at 123 (“Suspension . . . was used against Zimbabwe,
together with other restrictions, because of the continued serious violations of human rights and of the freedom of opinion, of association and of peaceful assembly . .
. .”).
162
Sandra Polaski, Protecting Labor Rights through Trade Agreements: An Analytical
Guide, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 13, 17 (2003).
163
Id. at 19.
164
Id. at 18 (The NAALC only provides “the possibility of dispute settlement and
fines for failure to protect three of eleven labor rights covered . . . . [L]aws on child
labor, minimum wage, and health and safety can be enforced . . . . However, freedom
of association, non-discrimination, forced labor, rights of migrant workers, and other
rights cannot be similarly enforced.”).
165
Id.
160
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As previously mentioned, the U.S.-Jordan FTA provides the widest latitude of enforcement measures should a country not comply
166
with the labor standards articulated.
Agreements “such as the U.SJordan FTA[] create a right for a country that is party to the agreement to challenge an alleged failure by another party to protect its
167
Possible enforcement measures include
citizens’ labor rights.”
withdrawal of trade benefits granted under the FTA or any other
168
“appropriate and commensurate measure,” including sanctions.
The U.S.-Jordan FTA does not limit enforceability to penalties, but
provides for more tailored enforcement to the particular violation by
169
By
allowing for any measure of enforcement that is “appropriate.”
establishing the availability of different options of enforcement, the
punishment imposed can be structured so as to achieve the principal
goals of penalties. These goals include a penalty that adequately deters a party from a violation, proportionality between the infraction
and the penalty, and a penalty that helps to ameliorate the viola170
tion.
CAFTA, and future FTAs, should undertake to incorporate the
aforementioned provisions into the agreements to make FTAs and
the labor provisions contained therein a recipe for success. The ideal
FTA would begin with the fundamental structure of CAFTA, such as
incorporating the labor provisions directly into the main body of the
171
agreement and articulating an international minimum standard of
172
workers’ rights by recognition of ILO principles.
The most meaningful FTA, however, would also call for adherence not only to ILO
principles, but also to universally accepted human rights, as best
173
This incorporation
demonstrated in the Cotonou Agreement.
would raise the bar for countries participating in FTAs and act as a
double incentive for the minimum standard of workers rights by requiring observance to human rights in general.

166

See U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 5. See also supra notes 131–37 and accompanying text.
167
Polaski, supra note 162, at 18.
168
U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 5, art. 17, para. 2(b).
169
See HEPPLE, supra note 1, at 117 (referring to the “open-ended” nature of enforcement measures in the US-Jordan FTA).
170
See Polaski, supra note 162, at 20 (suggesting standard objectives of penalties
and considerations in determining an appropriate penalty when labor provisions are
violated).
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See supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 127–30 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 154–60 and accompanying text.
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The ideal FTA would also advance a CAFTA-like capacity building mechanism to help solidify governmental infrastructure for the
attainment of secure working conditions. The model, however,
would go beyond mere capacity-building to establish reward-based
174
provisions, like those found in the CBTA.
These provisions would
provide further tangible incentives for countries to improve workers’
rights and fundamental labor principles by offering increased economic preferences for demonstrable improvements in these areas.
The final ingredient for success in FTAs is a reversion to wider
175
enforcement capabilities as found in the U.S.-Jordan FTA.
CAFTA
and other agreements have taken a step backwards from the “appropriate and commensurate” measures available in the U.S.-Jordan
176
agreement to a more “one size fits all” approach that limits en177
This enforceability to fines capped at fifteen million dollars.
forcement provision should not be eradicated in new FTAs, but
rather expanded upon, so that penalties may be imposed on a caseby-case basis in order to best achieve the objectives of deterrence,
proportionality, and amelioration.
Through an incorporation of the above mentioned provisions
into new FTAs, the labor provisions of such agreements are given a
substantial chance of accomplishing the goal of a meaningful international standard for labor rights.
CONCLUSION
As evidenced by the passage of CAFTA, the global community is
becoming more intertwined as the barriers to trade are reduced and
178
products and resources flow across borders.
In the continual
march toward free trade, the issue of the domestic labor conditions
of trading partners becomes a key element in the structuring of an
179
In order to reap the full gamut of benefits derived
agreement.
from free trade, a strong and enforceable standard for labor rights
needs to be incorporated as one of the pinnacle objectives of an
180
Although CAFTA includes many of the foundational eleFTA.
ments to accomplishing this goal, the future wave of FTAs should include more incentive to improve working conditions, higher stan174
175
176
177
178
179
180

See supra notes 147–53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 121–25 and accompanying text.
Id.
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part IV.C.
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dards for citizens, and greater flexibility in enforcing the labor stan181
Hopefully, through this incorporation, a recipe for success
dards.
may be developed to ensure that all participants in free trade are also
all recipients of its benefits.
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See supra Part IV.B.

